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Abstract: Adaptive agents use feedback as a key strategy to cope with un-
certainty and change in their environments. The information fed back from the
sensorimotor loop into the control subsystem can be used to change four different
elements of the controller: parameters associated to the control model, the control
model itself, the functional organization of the agent and the functional realiza-
tion of the agent. There are many change alternatives and hence the complexity of
the agent’s space of potential configurations is daunting. The only viable alterna-
tive for space- and time-constrained agents —in practical, economical, evolutionary
terms— is to achieve a reduction of the dimensionality of this configuration space.
Emotions play a critical role in this reduction. The reduction is achieved by func-
tionalization, interface minimization and by patterning, i.e. by selection among a
predefined set of organizational configurations. This analysis lets us state how au-
tonomy emerges from the integration of cognitive, emotional and autonomic sys-
tems in strict functional terms: autonomy is achieved by the closure of functional
dependency. Emotion-based morphofunctional systems are able to exhibit complex
adaptation patterns at a reduced cognitive cost. In this article we show a general
model of how emotion supports functional adaptation and how the emotional bi-
ological systems operate following this theoretical model. We will also show how
this model is also of applicability to the construction of a wide spectrum of artificial
systems1.
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An Approach to Emotion Research
Emotion theory is a very complex research domain due to the multifarious nature
of emotions and the multiple purposes, views and implications of such a theory
(Houwer and Hermans, 2010). As is the case with any scientific endeavor, cogni-
tive science of emotion shall advance by means of hypothesizing theories against a
backdrop of empirical data. In the context of emotion, however, this backdrop of
empirical data is, at least, confusing. From skin conductance measures, FMRi scans
of the amygdala, or concentrations of neuromodulators, to overt social behaviors,
facial expression or verbal reports of emotional qualia, the variety of facts to take
into account is daunting. It is difficult to categorize and integrate the ground truth
that we want to explain in biological emotion.
In a parallel line of activity, autonomous systems engineering is looking for func-
tional control architectures that could augment the performance and resilience of
technical systems operating in open-ended environments. In this work thread, en-
gineers are looking at the biology of emotional mechanisms in search for architec-
tural inspiration to achieve the levels of robust autonomy that animals demonstrate
(Fellous and Arbib, 2005; Samsonovich, 2012). Robustness is needed both for func-
tional and safety reasons, since deployment environments and required function-
alities are increasingly varied (Sanz et al., 2007a).
In this dual-context situation —biological cognitive science and cognitive sys-
tems engineering— models do play a central role. Models constitute the corner-
stones of both theories and implementations of systems. In particular, computer
models of emotion (Dyer, 1987; Marsella et al., 2010) play the role of rigorously
expressing a theoretical model for evaluating it.
In this article we will present a concrete, cybernetic, vision on what emotion is
and propose a derived agent architectural model that can serve as a blueprint for a
general theory of emotion. This theory can be used for both a) biological explanation
of emotional phenomena and b) engineering of better autonomous systems (Arbib
and Fellous, 2004). The Patterned Metacontrol model of emotion is based on the
basic idea of appraisal-driven metacontrol of functional organization patterns of
the cognitive-emotional agent.
The rest of the article will i) describe the state of the art in emotion research from
a systems modeling perspective, ii) analyze the context of adaptive systems where
this work sits, iii) introduce the issue of reconfiguration-based adaptation in high
autonomy systems, iv) propose the model of emotion as pattern-based metacontrol
which is the main content of this article, and v) conclude with an evaluation and
future perspectives for this work.
ASLab.org / A Model of Emotion as Patterned Metacontrol / A-2013-003 v 0.0 Draft 2
The Cognitive Modeling Flow
Computer implementations of cognitive models are common research assets in cog-
nitive science (Sun, 2008; McClelland, 2009). These models are created to better
understand a concrete biological or psychological process by both a) the rigorous
study that is necessary for building such a computer model and b) by a testbed eval-
uation of the model, constituted by a running program. Computer models are built
because the complexity of the modeled system is so high that performing mathe-
matical studies of analytical theoretical models is inviable. Computer models can
be simulated to validate them.
Figure 1 shows an overall activity flow when developing cognitive models us-
ing computer programming. These computerized models can be built from scratch
as conventional programs or can often be implemented using programmable cog-
nitive modeling engines like ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004; Stewart and West, 2007)
or SOAR (Laird et al., 1987; Laird and Newell, 1993) .
In many cases, the implementation and proper evaluation of computer models
of some specific phenomena requires their framing inside wider realizations of gen-
eral cognitive architectures. Specific implementations of general theories of mind
are used to provide and adequate and complete experimental context, including
all the cognitive features that are necessary for the evaluation of the more specific
models of concrete psychological phenomena. For example, the evaluation of a
model of an emotion like fear may require a minimal agent capable of both per-
ceiving some frightful entity or situation and acting in accordance with what has
been perceived. In a very precise sense, as will be addressed in this article, emo-
tions make sense only over other cognitive competences of the agents.
The computer-based model development process, whether using a conventional
programming language or any of the domain specific languages of these cognitive
architecture engines, starts with the selection of a concrete cognitive aspect to be
addressed; e.g. visual target tracking, spoken word recognition in cocktail parties,
fear of bears, etc. This behavioral aspect will be analyzed and characterized in terms
of model needs. The modeling workflow continues with the proposal of an abstract
model that will be later translated into a more concrete realization: a computer
implementation. Abstract models are usually described using textual, narrative
descriptions. In many cases informal diagrams do accompany the descriptive text.
These diagrams are usually composed of boxes and arrows (Shaw and Clements,
1997) and help communicate the inner structure of the model. This may improve
the precise understanding of the model, but in many cases it may convey a false
impression of rigor, due to the concretion of the model in a componential structure
and a set of causal signal flows. Note that the abstract model, while being abstract,
must still be precise enough as to rigorously drive the model construction process
(Bosse et al., 2008; Sanz et al., 2010b).
Obviously not all cognitive models described in the literature comply with this
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Figure 1: A common activity flow when developing cognitive models of concrete agent be-
haviors using computer programs: from the abstract model to the computer implementation.
The central box shows the main modeling activities and the different models are shown on
the right part. The abstract model is usually captured using non-formal languages. The
computer model is formal and is validated by means of simulation.
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precision requirement. Many of them are expressed in too weak terms to be eas-
ily translatable into programs. In other, even more extreme cases, the described
models contain not just fuzzy but non-computable and/or metaphysical elements
that are a-priori non-translatable to computer programs. Computer implementa-
tions are a filter of weak, non positive theories; a filter that may be considered too
strict by some researchers, because it rules out the possibility of incorporating non-
computational aspects into the models.
The step from abstract model to a concrete one requires the building of a com-
puter model in the precise terms of the programming language used. This step
is usually done by programmers codifying the abstract descriptions depicted in
text, boxes and arrows by means of a computer programming language. This lan-
guage may be a general purpose programming language like C, Java or Python, or
a domain specific language as is the case of the programming languages of SOAR,
ACT-R, NeuroML (Gleeson et al., 2010), or BRAHMS (Mitchinson et al., 2008).
Computer programs can only be executed if they are complete. However, the
abstract models captured in text-and-boxes descriptions are not complete —in sys-
tems engineering terms. The computer model has to be completed —filled-in the
blanks— with some magic from the hands of the programmer. Additions and hacks
must be introduced in the program to address necessary issues not specified in the
model —e.g. I/O relations, system maintenance issues, data formats and organiza-
tion, etc. The computer model suffering this enlargement departs from the abstract
one, sometimes substantially, as those hacks are usually not conceptualized and
fed-back into the abstract model.
A more rigorous and complete process for cognitive model and architecture
specification is necessary in order to fully evaluate and compare alternative models
(Sanz et al., 2009). However, while this problem is pervasive in computer modeling
of cognition —esp. in immature areas like emotion or consciousness— the model-
ing strategy shall be kept apace, as it is the core strategy of successful science.
The computer model built in this way must be validated and this is done by
means of simulation. The specific simulations to be performed will depend on the
concrete implementation of the model. In many cases the testing of emotion mod-
els is done in whole agents —simulated or robotic— to evaluate the behavioral
responses in certain environmental settings (See Figure 2).
Experiments with virtual rats in virtual mazes are common trade in this context.
The biological significance of these results is dubious, as the ecological relevance
of the virtual contexts is under discussion. The experiments, however, are able to
demonstrate that certain cognitive architectures are able to produce certain classes
of behaviors that are homologous to biological behaviors at a certain level of ab-
straction (Webb and Consi, 2001; Webb, 2009).
Simulation results are validated against the ground truth. In this process there
are two levels of validation that sometimes get mixed up:
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Figure 2: The VRat Webots-based simulation ground for the evaluation of the cognitive-
emotional models developed in the ICEA research project (Hernandez et al., 2010).
• Implementation validation, i.e. checking that the programmed implementation
complies with the abstract model.
• Model validation, i.e. checking that the abstract model fully addresses the emo-
tional explananda.
If the simulation results are good enough, the validation analysis can be feed
into the model to release a final, validated version. On the contrary, if validation
results are not good enough they may lead to a necessary review of the model at any
of the previous stages. This implies returning to previous stages of the modeling
workflow:
• Perform new simulation experiments to get more data concerning other ex-
perimental environments, situations or statistically relevant data concerning
agent behaviors.
• Reprogramming of the model when the behavior produced is not the ex-
pected one and the source of the problem is erroneous mapping to code.
• Revision of the abstract model if the previous revisions do not produce the
expected results. This is the hardest and seldom done backtrack movement
because it implies both abandoning previous theoretical thoughts and pro-
ducing a new theoretical model —always a hard task.
In this process there is an enormous risk that is not fully recognized. When
reprogramming the model, using the unconstrained hacking strategy mentioned
before, it is always possible to obtain any desired behavior thanks to the flexibility
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of software2. The model and the program can get broken apart in this process,
losing the necessary modeling connection. To avoid this rupture, the programed
model and the abstract model must be kept in consonance. It is necessary to be
aware of this problem and use development methods that can keep and enforce this
correlation. The strategy used in the developments described in this article is called
model-driven development (Balmelli et al., 2006; Sanz et al., 2009), where the step
from abstract model to code is automated by means of development tools, hence
leaving no gaps for model-program mismatch (Sztipanovits and Karsai, 1997).
Motivation for emotion in technical systems
As was said before, most computer models of emotion are built to evaluate theoret-
ical models that cannot be verified but by simulation in virtual testbeds. However,
the pursue of technological assets for the implementation of emotional systems in
artifacts may have other, quite different motivations. For example Kushiro et al.
(2013) show how emotion can be used to drive conceptual learning processes for
robots in unknown environments.
The rationales for research on artificial emotion can be reduced to three basic
kinds:
1. Evaluation of theoretical models of emotion. This is the main context, as was
described before.
2. Implementation of human-like machines. This can be done for the improve-
ment of usability of machines in human-tuned niches —e.g. to better handle
human-machine interaction— or can be done for the simple hubris of build-
ing artificial humans.
3. Construction of better artifacts. The idea is to exploit architectural control
patterns reverse-engineered from animals. Bio-inspiration in this context is
guided by the evolutionary psychology dogma that all mental traits are there
because of their adaptive value. In principle, they could be also leveraged in
artifacts (Sanz, 2003).
The work described here is part of a larger research project whose objective is
to produce universal control technology for improving mission-level resilience in
technical systems in broad domains. The ASys Project3 pursues the global objective
of attaining robust autonomy by means of incorporation of cognitive mechanisms
2This risk is reduced when using constrained programming models as is the case of the domain
specific programming languages and is maximal when programming using generic programming
languages.
3http://www.aslab.org/public/projects/ASys
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into the machines. Both terms —autonomy and robustness— do have precise mean-
ings in this context (Sanz et al., 2000; Hansen and Sargent, 2007): being able to fulfill
missions even under the presence of external and internal disturbances.
This article describes an initial theoretical result emerging from the on-going
general design work that is leveraging architectural organizations of emotional
mechanisms of animals in search for the needed robustness. Note that this work is
not trying to build models to replicate biological behavior but to create universal
architectural assets. This implies that the validation of the models is not going to
be done in terms of biological ground truth —i.e. by animats imitating behavior of
real animals— but in terms of absolute performance of technical systems.
The model presented, however, intends generality and, as such, may lead to
implementations of ecologically-relevant experimental testbeds; hence serving the
purposes of biological model validation as described in the previous section The
Cognitive Modeling Flow.
Emotion in vivo and in silico
There are many facets of emotion that can constitute the ground truth that is the
target of the modeling effort. Affective states, emotional states, cognitive impact,
physiological impact, evolutionary development, emotional expression, emotional
appraisal, etc. have been catalogued and used as raw backdrops for the wide variety
of emotion theories.
In all this landscape of the emotional phenomena, we can identify four core
aspects of emotion:
Behavioral/expressive — Generate specific modes of action and doing an exter-
nalization of inner state for social interaction.
Experiential/subjective — State valuation and generation of qualia associated to
the appraisal of situations.
Somatic/neurophysiological — Changes in bodily state to properly react to situa-
tions; includes alterations in neurophysiological and hormonal systems.
Cognitive/interpretive — State representation of ongoing situations and impact to
the agent; updating of the mental model about goals and values.
Considering the objectives of our research project, a fundamental question emerges:
Are all those many aspects to be considered in machines? Or only the last one has
any meaning? The answer lies on the teleonomic nature of both. Machines are
very different from humans in many senses, but there are two aspects of maximal
relevance for addressing these questions:
ASLab.org / A Model of Emotion as Patterned Metacontrol / A-2013-003 v 0.0 Draft 8
Purpose: Humans are natural and machines are artificial; this shall be understood
in the precise sense of artificial defined by Simon (Simon, 1996). Humans
are not created with a purpose —usually— but machines always are. The
professional competences of the engineers are specifically focused on that:
build systems that satisfy allocentric purposes.
Realization: The design of humans is evolutionary and their construction is or-
ganic. The design of machines can be constructionist or constructivist —
somehow mimicking biological “design” (Chaput, 2004; Tho´risson, 2009). The
construction of machines is never organic but in limited experimental settings
(Lipson and Pollack, 2000) or in the case of virtual machines (Serugendo et al.,
2011; Tchao et al., 2011).
This implies that when trying to elaborate a general theory of emotion, pur-
pose and realization cannot be part of the theory. A general theory of emotion
shall be of applicability no matter what is the purpose of the system and inde-
pendently of the realization technology. This may then imply that only the expe-
riential/subjective and the cognitive/interpretive aspects are of relevance for an
universal, architecture-centric theory of emotion.
Emotion in biological systems
Affective neuroscience has tried to identify the neural bases of emotion (Panksepp,
1998; Davidson and Sutton, 1995) following a research line opened by James Papez
centered on the brain-wide distributed aspect of emotion. Papez (Papez, 1995) pro-
posed to distinguish two fundamental aspects of emotion: the stream of thought
and the stream of feeling. In the first, the stream of thought, sensory information
is transmitted via the thalamus to the neocortex side areas to become perception,
thought and memory. The stream of feeling is the basis of the feeling of subjec-
tive experience via thalamus to hypothalamus (in particular hypothalamic mam-
millary bodies), arriving in the cingulate cortex, which hosts the emotional expe-
rience. These pathways are represented in the popular “Papez circuit”, a classical
neuroscience boxology example (see Figure 3).
The Limbic System
Paul MacLean (MacLean, 1949) proposed a global emotional theory basing his
work on theories of Papez, Canon, Klu¨ver and Bucy. Heinrich Klu¨ver and Paul
Bucy (Kluwer and Bucy, 1939) conducted studies of the brain areas involved in
visual hallucinations caused by drugs. They obtained important results on visual
perception, long-term memory and emotion that strongly influenced the work of
Paul MacLean.
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Figure 3: The Papez dual circuit theory of the functional topology of emotion in the brain
(Papez, 1995). Both the stream of thought and the stream of feeling go from the emotional
stimuli to the feeling. The “gyrus cinguli” —the cingulate cortex— acts as integrator of
the thought and feeling signal streams to generate the emotional feelings. Bodily responses
are triggered only by the stream of feeling.
According to MacLean, the brain contains the signal integrators underlying emo-
tions that fuse perceptions from outside with gut feelings. In his triune brain theory,
the proposed limbic system —septum, amygdalae, hypothalamus, hippocampal
complex, and cingulate cortex— is the product of early phylogenetic evolution for
survival and protection of the individual, hence being a major functional system
for the agent.
Subsequently, various studies including LeDoux (1996, 2000a) have shown that
the limbic system is not a complete structure well delimited functionally or anatom-
ically. This has led, therefore, to eliminate the idea of unique neural circuits for
emotion.
The Amygdala
LeDoux and also Phelps (2006) studied the amygdala and its role in fear condi-
tioning processes and defense responses in rats. In the amygdala several signals
converge both from external perception (auditory, visual, etc. ) and somatosensory
perceptions —e.g. of electric shocks or other unconditioned stimulus. Under this
viewpoint, two sensory pathways converge in the same center in the brain —the
amygdala: The conditioned stimulus crosses the thalamus and the cerebral cortex
to the amygdala, and the reactions of the unconditioned stimulus through the tha-
lamus and the somatosensory cortex. From the core of the amygdala information
flows to the brainstem and hypothalamus to result in the behavioral and physio-
logical responses of fear.
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Several neuroimaging studies in humans (Adolphs et al., 1995; Phelps and LeDoux,
2005; Dolcos et al., 2011; Rosen and Donley, 2006) have established that the amyg-
dala is activated in in proportion to the perception of fear. Morris et al. (1998) stud-
ied this same activation when the conditioned stimulus is unconsciously perceived,
obtaining a similar result. The activation of other subcortical nuclei (superior col-
liculus and pulvinar) influenced the theoretical conclusion that there are subcorti-
cal ways to detect emotional phenomena. The amygdala plays an important role
in emotional memory, in the recognition of facial and body expressions of fear, etc.
See later section on Patterns in Biological Emotion.
The Prefontal Cortex
Harlow, Phineas Gage’s physician, discovered an astonishing personality change
following an injury in the prefrontal cortex. Subsequent work — e.g. from Damasio
(Damasio, 1994) confirms the participation of prefrontal cortex in the brain sys-
tems involved in emotion. This is also confirmed by current human neuroimaging
studies (Davidson et al., 2003). Apparently, it has only a modulatory function of
additional components that are deeply involved in the generation of the emotional
response. Miller et al. (Miller and Cohen, 2001) and Ochsner et al. (Ochsner et al.,
2002) suggest that the prefrontal cortex helps adjusting the emotional response to
be adaptive.
Kringelbach (Kringelbach and Berridge, 2009) states that the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) of nonhuman primates is activated by primary reinforcers (e.g. food when
the animal is hungry) and is deactivated in satiety situations. This suggests that
the OFC is involved in learning emotional and motivational value of stimuli, as
it is involved in the emotional response when it involves reinforcement-learned
contingencies.
Emotions influence reasoning and decision-making behavior. Damasio proposes
the theory of somatic markers to explain the relationship between emotion and rea-
soning. The Phineas Gage (Barker, 1995; Baars and Gage, 2007) case analysis has
led to the conclusion that his personality change came from the lesions in the OFC
and the VMC (ventromedial cortex). According to the theory of somatic markers,
the processing of somatic signals of emotional nature has its substrate in the VMC
and the medial sector of the OFC.
The VMC is a secondary association area that integrates information from dif-
ferent sensory modalities, somatosensory areas responsible for keeping the body
bioregulatory equilibrium, areas involved in emotion processing, and also areas re-
lated to working memory. VMC and OFC play a critical role in the evaluation of
external information about ongoing events, and internal information about bodily
sensations and emotional state.
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The Anterior Cingulate Cortex
Different studies (Bush et al., 2000; Davidson et al., 2002; Shackman et al., 2011) sug-
gest that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) appears to be related to the expression
of emotion and conscious experience (also associated by Papez with conscious ex-
perience). This work establishes a distinction between an affective section and a
cognitive section of the ACC, occupying posterior and anterior parts of the area in
question, respectively.
The affective section seems to be part of the autonomic nervous system acti-
vation control in emotional experience dealing with afferents related to emotional
experience (nucleus accumbens, amygdala, etc. ). The cognitive sector is closely
related to cognitive processing, the selection of emotional responses and reasoning
to solve conflict within the information available for decision making. It is closely
related to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior and parietal ACC and also
the supplementary motor area and the spinal cord.
Searching Fundamental Emotion Theories
The ASys research program tries to leverage emotion in machines in a rigorous and
architecture-centric, systematic way (Bass et al., 1996; Sanz et al., 2008). In order to
do that it is necessary to have a theory of emotion that departs from biological
constraints and is fully rooted in general systems theory.
The traditional approach to biologically inspired control architectures for ma-
chines is exemplified in the paradigmatic example of building robot controllers in-
spired by neuroscience results (Dario et al., 2005; Tamburrini and Datteri, 2005;
Ziemke, 2008; Herna´ndez et al., 2011; Krichmar, 2012). This is done by both neu-
roscientists and roboticists, each for the specific purposes of their own domains of
activity. Both robot-based cognitive modeling and brain-inspired robotics try to leverage
results and possibilities of the other domain (see Figure 4).
Domain 2: 
Cognitive
Robotics
Domain 1:
Cognitive
Neuroscience
Brain-inspired 
robotics
Model
Validation
Figure 4: The conventional dual bio-inspiration paths from biology to technology and back.
Cognitive robots are built following cognitive neuroscience models and are used as realiza-
tions to test those cognitive models. Biology inspires technology and technology evaluates
biology.
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The two activities exploit the potential cybernetic equivalence —i.e. the equiv-
alence at a specific systemic level— between the bodies, sensors and actuators of
robots and animals. This equivalence implies that a controller —a cybernetic en-
gine for action— may be translated from one system to the other if some equiva-
lence conditions apply. The most common strategy has been to create robots based
on reverse-engineered functional and anatomic relations in the brains of different
classes of animals (Hernandez et al., 2010). If the brain reverse-engineered, neural
controller for the robot works, this means that the cognitive neuroscience theory
was right and that it may be used to build robots.
As a paradigmatic example, researchers have looked at man and tried to create
a robot in his image and likeness, in the hope that a human-like embodiment will
render the neural architecture meaningful. This is the core argument and strategy
of humanoid robotics and biorobotics (Webb and Consi, 2001; Aldridge et al., 2000;
Breazeal, 2004; Gini et al., 2009).
However, this strategy is strongly misguided, and most of the results shall be
considered as only relevant for the impact they may produce in mass media (Sanz
et al., 2010a). The implemented architectures are usually tuned to the concrete ex-
perimental conditions of the tests (e.g. rats in virtual labyrinths, see Figure 2) and
lack the flexibility of real neural controllers and the dependability needed in robot
applications.
There is no easy engineering method to apply these architectures to real systems;
generality and robustness are missing. The only possibility left by this approach is
the systematic evaluation and testing in all operational conditions to get a statisti-
cal guarantee that the robot will behave properly. This verification and validation
strategy by means of testing is similar to the strategy used in some software ap-
plications (e.g. productivity suites or video games) but it is useless for systems of
higher operational complexity or tighter safety requirements. A more adequate
research strategy is depicted in Figure 5.
The transfer of control designs from biological realization in the brain to real-
world, dependable robots must pass through a theorization process. This means
that we shall 1) extract generic control architecture designs from the brain to be able to
2) apply them rigorously in a robot engineering process.
To this end, and specifically in relation to leveraging the value of biological emo-
tion, the ASys research project follows an stepped program:
1. Find fundamental emotion architectural organizations in the brain.
2. Eliminate unnecessary biological details in the modeling of emotion.
3. Consolidate these organizations in domain-independent models.
4. Transfer to realizations of technological usability.
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Figure 5: The path from cognitive neuroscience to cognitive robotics shall go through a gen-
eral theory of cognition. Cognitive robots shall be built using rigorous systems engineering
methods and not as cognitive models. Cognitive modeling shall produce rigorous theory
and avoid falling into the easy methods of computer and robot melling.
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As was said before, the variety of the emotional phenomena makes difficult the
elaboration of grand, unified theories (Moffat et al., 1995). The emotion phenomena
seems too heterogeneous to be addressable by a single theory. However, emotion
theorists have tried to do so. The usual strategy is to identify the core aspect of emo-
tion and propose a theory for it. This theory can latter be applied to the derivation
of ad-hoc explanations for specific emotions and emotional scenarios.
These theories may have many different forms, as is the case of spreading ac-
tivation models —networks of nodes of cognitive-emotional bundles—, componen-
tial models —organizational variations in cognitive processes—, or parameter-based
models —appraisal dimensions that map to expressions. These theories span and
are scattered along the whole emotional process, from appraisal to external effects
of emotion. The theories of Lazarus (Lazarus, 1991), Panksepp (Panksepp, 1982),
Damasio (Damasio et al., 1996), LeDoux (LeDoux, 1996), Scherer (Scherer, 2009) and
Rolls (Rolls, 2005) are good examples of deep theories trying to deal with emotions
in this way.
Adaptive systems
The theoretical framework for the ASys theory of emotion is the framework of au-
tonomous systems. Autonomous systems are able to reach their goals in the pres-
ence of disturbances. The more complex the goals and the environment are, the
more sophisticated the agent should be. Control and cognition are the solutions
that we explore. Complex cognition is required to build advanced autonomous
systems. Ashby law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1956) states it clearly: the variety
of the controller must match the variety of the problem.
Agents and Value
A characterization of the nature of goals and the way goals are attained by the
agent seems necessary in order to understand our model of emotion. As we will
see, emotions and agent goals are closely related through the concepts of value and
function. In essence, emotions will shape agent’s functionality in order to reach
valuable goals. Cognitive-emotional agents can determine their own functional
organization.
Agents having advanced cognitive capabilities —e.g. Dennett’s Popperian agents
(Dennett, 1996)— will not merely react to the present state of things but take also
into account what the future will be. Agents anticipate the future state of their
world (Rosen, 2012; Lorini, 2011). They will decide about their many potential ac-
tions taking into account how the future will be.
At any particular time instant, the selection and execution of a concrete action
alternative will shape the agent’s future. To properly make a selection among the
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several possible actions, the agent shall not only anticipate its instantaneous ef-
fects or the final state that may be reached. It must also determine the evolution
of a state-dependent value-for-the-agent along the whole, anticipated, system trajec-
tory. The emotional system will help determine the value of each state of affairs,
both present and anticipated. Note that due to the multiplicity of possible actions
and to the pervasive uncertainty, there will be many potential, anticipated trajecto-
ries. The evaluation is hence not simple and straightforward, but implying several
counterfactual, anticipated states.
This evaluation of expected value along the different alternative potential future
trajectories is what the agent uses to decide what to do. This means that the final
state to be reached is not strictly the real goal that autonomous agents seek. What
agents seek is to have a behavior that maximizes the accumulated value got while
behaving. As we will se later, emotions will play a critical role in shaping this
behavior by shaping agent’s organization (Marinier III et al., 2009).
In the case of biological systems, this machinery for future valuation may be
embedded into the machinery for action generation, hence the agent lacking any
explicit form of valuation representation. In conscious decision-making, however,
this explicit representation is needed. This is the role played by the phenomenology
of emotion (Sanz et al., 2012). We need explicit representations of the instantaneous
state-of-affairs value for the agent to include them in cognitive control. This does
not necessarily mean that any cognitive anticipatory agent must experience emo-
tional qualia as we do, but the existence of such a phenomenology may be a need.
In summary, action selection generates behaviors that try to maximize accumu-
lated value, not just reach a specific valuable state. The final states are hence con-
ditioned by the shape of value along the trajectories across the agent state space.
Emotions play a critical role in determining both the value of a specific state and
the behavior of the agent guided by this value. We cannot understand how agents
pursue goals without the elicitation of this emotional mechanism.
Emotion and Autonomy
In the pursue of a general technology for autonomy we are investigating the emotion-
cognition integration architecture in biological agents. The rationale for this re-
search is that emotions are adaptive —in the evolutionary biology sense— improv-
ing competence of the agent to operate in a certain, unstable niche. A dogma of
evolutionary psychology is that all mental traits have or have had adaptive value
(Cosmides and Tooby, 2003).
The systems-level analysis of the emotional phenomena led us to two architec-
tural conclusions:
• Emotions are control architecture systems directly serving the goals of the
autonomous agent.
ASLab.org / A Model of Emotion as Patterned Metacontrol / A-2013-003 v 0.0 Draft 16
• They do so by providing real-time adaptation mechanisms to the agent.
The two key words in this analysis are goals and adaptation. Emotions are mecha-
nisms that augment the capability of the agent to focus its action readiness on goals
of relevance. In every time instant, a complex agent may have many concerns:
such as be warm, seek food, escape predator, etc. In essence, we can say that emo-
tional systems are used to determine what, among the many things that the agent
is concerned about, is important. Emotions do rank goals.
But beyond goal ranking —the well-identified appraisal processes of emotion—
emotional systems do positively act towards those goals. And they do so by means
of adaptation of the functional structure of the agent.
The issue of adaptation is pervasive in autonomous systems. Evolutionary the-
ory focuses on adaptation processes at a scale beyond the individual (Gould, 2002).
Morphofunctional theory focus on adaptation at the individual level (Hara and
Pfeifer, 2003). Both natural and artificial autonomous systems do adapt at these
two scales: animals as species and as individuals and machines as artifacts and
product lines.
From this perspective, adaptation shall be framed in the context of autonomy
(Sanz et al., 2000). To understand, explain and engineer autonomy we must con-
sider three interrelated aspects:
Autonomy = F (body, environment, task)
We cannot say that “a system is autonomous” but instead “a system is au-
tonomous to carry out a particular task, in a concrete environment with a specific
body realization”. If we change any of these factors we may lose autonomy to
perform and attain the task goals. Time —e.g. a deadline— is also a factor to be
considered but, in general, this is not an issue in the vernacular use of the term
“autonomous” and in a more technical use of the term it shall be included in the
specification of the task.
Emotion theory shall be framed in this context and we can say, summarily, that
emotional systems appraise the state of the external and internal environment to
determine its value in relation to a set of goals and reconfigure the agent organiza-
tion to maximize the expectancy of value. If the analysis is so compact and simple,
the questions are then: How is this realized? Why so many emotions?
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Reconfiguration in Cognitive Systems
Reconfiguring Systems
System adaptation by reconfiguration is a very old topic in all classes of computing
systems research; from fault-tolerance to modern embedded and web-based sys-
tems (Deconinck et al., 1994; Weston, 1999; Fiadeiro and Lopes, 2010; Bayar and
Yurdakul, 2012). The backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart et al., 1986) offers a
strategy for reconfiguration in architectures using the neural network paradigm.
Selfridge’s Pandemonium (Selfridge, 1958) offers a strategy for tuning the pan-
demonium based on signals flowing back from the cognitive demons layer into
the computational demons layer. The functional reconfiguration approach of de la
Mata (de la Mata and Rodrı´guez, 2010) offers an universal model-based approach
for process reorganization.
In general, reconfiguration is driven by processes that try to match the organi-
zation of the agent to what is needed to accomplish certain goal. Andrew uses the
term “significance feedback” to refer to these processes (Andrew, 2009). We have
used the term “structural feedback” for similar purposes (Sanz and Lo´pez, 2000).
In essence the issue is the change of the function of the system as realized internally
to match the function of the system as required externally. Note the two different
uses of the word “function” in the previous sentence (Lind, 1990).
The strategy that attains a maximum impact in the shaping of behavior with a
minimal effort, is the change of the control systems of the agent. Sliding mode con-
trol (Edwards and Spurgeon, 1998) —SMC— or variable structure control (Zinober,
1994) —VSC— are forms of nonlinear control developed as evolution of linear con-
trollers to address their operational range limitations. In these methods, the core
nonlinear dynamics is produced by application of a switching control signal that
forces a behavior that crosses a set of more “normal” dynamics. The control law,
usually a state-feedback controller, is not a continuous function of time but a patchy
one —continuously moving from one smooth patch to another.
In essence, the abstract structure of the controller —i.e. its control law— de-
pends on the region of the state space where the system is. The controller switches
control laws when crossing the borders of these regions. A common implementa-
tion is based on the fast switching among linear controllers at possibly very fast
speeds. However the elementary controllers need not be linear and only continuity
is required.
These controllers apply a strong control action —with practically infinite gain to
force the behavior of the dynamic system to trajectories sliding along the restricted
mode subspace— and must be applied with more care than other forms of more
smooth and moderate nonlinear control. Due to design and implementation errors,
the aggressive variable structure control action can lead to chatter, noise, energy
losses, excitation of unmodelled dynamics and faults.
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Change and Timescale
In the previous analysis, however, it is not clear whether we are talking about learn-
ing, adaptation, reconfiguration, tuning, etc. when talking about non-static control
structures4. Apart of what parts of the system are changing, the temporal aspect
seems critical in all these phenomena. Here we hypothesize that the main differ-
ence between cognitive control, learning and emotion is the fact that the reconfigu-
ration provided by emotion operates in real time (Liu, 2000).
Environment
Agent
internal
 dynamics
external
 dynamics
coupling
agent
organization
Figure 6: The dynamics of the agent-environment
system is governed by the coupling of the dynamics
of the world and the internal dynamics of the agent.
Agent behavior is an emergent result of this coupled
dynamics.
Agent behavior if not fully determined by the agent architecture but by the
whole agent-environment system. The dynamics of the agent-environment system
is governed by the coupling of the dynamics of the world and the internal dynam-
ics of the agent (see Figure 6). The internal dynamics of the agent is determined by
its organization —a bundle of parts and their relations(Rosen, 1970). Agents con-
trol their behavior by modifying their internal state and organization. This happens
dynamically in search of value-for-the-agent maximization.
There are many processes at many different timescales in the dynamic change
of agents:
4The simple flow of perception is also a dynamical change. However, we may assume the persis-
tence of some structure in this process in the very sense of Klir hypothetical structure (Klir, 1969).
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• Agents react to events in the environment.
• Agents cognitively control inner and outer processes to attain goals.
• Agents learn how to do things.
• Agents adapt to changing environments.
We can identify two levels of change: changes in the agent state and changes
in the agent organization5. Conventional control systems engineering focuses in
systems that change state but not organization. The key for general autonomy is
structural adaptation: the change in systems organization to respond to environmen-
tal challenges. Some control systems technology is already addressing this but in a
very limited way (e.g. some forms of adaptive control, context awareness or fault-
tolerant control).
Structural Adaptation
By structural adaptation the agent changes its systemic structure. A system is de-
fined by characterizing its parts and the relations between them:
Agent = {Parts,Relations}
In the case of cognitive agents like robots or animals we may identify two big
classes of parts: physical parts and control parts. The changes that the agent suffers
—reaction, control, learning, adaptation— may affect both the body and the mind.
Mind structural changes are easier and more flexible due to the plastic, informa-
tional nature of minds.
When an animal decides between fighting or flying, there are no big physical
changes in it. The fight-or-flight response —as hypothesized by Cannon— is a re-
action to immediate threats with a general discharge of the sympathetic nervous
system. The way of doing this is by priming the animal for fighting or fleeing. This
priming is essentially a priming of a specific functional organization of the biological sys-
tem of the animal. The sympathetic nervous system alters the relations between the
animal parts. The concrete instantiation of the functional organization is selected
dynamically by the activation of the sympathetic system and the adrenal-cortical
system by the hypothalamus. These have cascading activation effects over the
glands, muscles, adrenal medulla or ACTH (adrenocorticotropic hormone) system.
The global behavioral disposition of the animal changes. The concrete response
that is enacted —fight-or-flight— may then depend on minimal appraisals.
5Obviously a change of organization is a change of the agent state in a general systems sense,
but we will use the term agent state to refer only to an internal representation of some state of affairs
relevant to the goals of the agent (it is indeed a subset of the general agent state).
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This selection of a functional organization is sometimes called action readiness.
Action readiness is a core topic in behavioral emotion theories; for example Frijda
(Frijda, 1986, 2007) specifically proposes that the behavior in emotion comes from
animal’s action readiness.
In a quick analysis, we consider that the most effective strategy for an economic
agent is to perform the structural adaptation by means of changes in the structure
of relationships and not in the parts that compose the agent:
Agent = {Parts,Rels} → Agent′ = {Parts,Rels′}
This implies that in general, what we can expect is that the agent addresses adap-
tation by the implementation of control mechanisms over the inner relational cou-
plings.
Architectural Change
This model of functional reorganization has the required generality (see previous
section Searching Fundamental Emotion Theories) for the purposes of our research.
By focusing on systems architecture it is possible to address the analysis of multi-
goal, teleonomic aspects of natural and artificial systems by means of their self-
adaptation (Cheng et al., 2006). We will use the term “architecture” to refer to the
functional organization of the agent (Bass et al., 2013; van Lamsweerde, 2003). Note
that in general this functional organization includes both physical and informa-
tional parts; each one playing its specific role into the architecture.
Architectural change in the process of modifying the functional organization of
the agent. It offers the possibility of creating flexible and resilient artificial agents
that are better tuned to changing environments. It is a capability shown by brains
when adapting to physical changes —e.g. due to strokes or surgery. This capability
is exploited in adaptive robotics at different scales: from the micro-grained changes
of neural evolutionary robotics to the macro-grained changes of fault tolerant in-
dustrial robotics. It is the plasticity of the architecture what is most critical in the
provision of adaptive performance.
By architectural change we can create new agent organizations that are radically
better tuned to their environments and goals. This means that architectural change
is a radical force for autonomy.
Sometimes the analysis and/or design of a functional structure needs not ad-
dressing the whole system architecture. Some functionalities can be ascribed to
partial organizations that can be inherited (or reused in the artificial world) by de-
scendants; hence becoming organizational memes for species of agents. We will
use the term “architectural patterns” to refer to them, borrowing the use of the
expression from the domain of design of software systems (Gamma et al., 1995;
Alexander et al., 1977; Cloutier and Verma, 2007).
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Design patterns are functional organizations and reusable strategies used in soft-
ware engineering. Architectural design patterns are design patterns that address
high level organizational aspects of the system and are used to systematically de-
sign systems that manifest certain properties. System architecture is what deter-
mines most the performance of a system.
Patterns can be composed to get a composite of the features that they individu-
ally provide. We will look at emotion as an architectural pattern operating over
other architectural patterns focused on action generation. We see emotion as a
pattern-based pattern. Agents use emotions as mechanisms to select from a cat-
alog of agent organizations and enact the most adequate to respond to ongoing
challenges.
Taming the adaptation problem
Architectural change is a radical force for adaptation. Radical forces usually have
associated difficulties and risks that shall be addressed to obtain viable systems.
Consider the problem of adapting a cognitive agent organization to an environ-
mental change. There are plenty of possibilities of change that lead to myriads of
alternative organizations. The space of architectural variation may be enormously
complex (Sloman, 1995; Brun et al., 2013). The big risk is that almost all the possi-
bilities will be wrong alternatives.
There is a big difficulty of a general adaptation strategy based on structural
change: the dimension of the space of organizational possibilities is too big. We
need criteria to decide what organizations or changes are adequate and what are
not. In essence, to change the organization is to re-design the system and design
is, in general, an inverse problem of enormous difficulty. This is so because the
connection between architectural organization and goal-oriented effectiveness is
extremely complex in general.
There are two general strategies that are of applicability for real-time solution of
this problem: evolution and pattern reuse. In evolutionary approaches the new or-
ganization is produced more or less randomly —by mutations— and then selected
by filtering criteria. It is used to see if it works or not, and is accepted if successful
and rejected if wrong (Nolfi and Floreano, 2000). In essence, since we cannot go
backwards from ends (goals) to means (designs) due to complexity, we try to go
forward randomly to see what happens. This strategy is good to evolve animals
if we don’t mind that in most cases they are going to die due to dreadful muta-
tions. But this is unacceptable for a commercial plane that must confront an engine
failure.
The second alternative for architectural change selection is pattern reuse. This
approach is based on reusing ways of organization that worked in the past. Instead
of selecting random changes we restrict the selection to a small group of previously
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known alternatives. It is possible to simplify the design problem of autonomous
agents by means of the generation of operational patterns: forms of agent compo-
nents and partial organizations that are tuned to specific niches and tasks. Many
fault-tolerant systems operate this way. Alternative patterns are identified at de-
sign time and realized in latent form until needed to address run-time faults.
The evolutionary and the pattern-based architectural adaptation methods are
not incompatible. In fact, what we are suggesting in this article is that selection
operates on functional patterns and not on whole agent architectures; i.e. patterns
and not agents is what evolution selects.
Two basic ”design” processes
The evolution of architecture-driven, functional reorganization of agents that im-
plements the emotional mechanism is driven by two concurrent processes of evo-
lutionary design:
Functionalisation — that produces systems composed by functional units.
Patterning — that captures and reuses subsystem organizations.
Functionalization is a process of function-based system re-organization. It is a
form of refactoring the functional structure of a system. It usually operates under
an evolutionary temporal horizon, but in plastic systems (e.g. those concerning
mental functions in natural systems or software-intensive artificial systems) it may
involve a single individual. It is driven by 1) the modularization of subsystems (e.g.
the organs) by means of a process of subsystems’ interfaces minimization, and 2)
the aggregation into higher structures by means of interface homogenization i.e. the
use of a common integration infrastructure (e.g. signaling molecules or computer
protocols) that is shared across many subsystems.
The patterning process captures architectural patterns in a form that enables its
reuse. The form of reuse will depend on the ontogenetic and adaptation processes
of the agent. These patterns will appear both at the realization —i.e. anatomical—
level and at the organization —i.e. physiological— level.
The relation between anatomy and physiology is the old relation between struc-
ture and function (Go´mez et al., 2008). The many physiological patterns that are
required for the different operating modes of the agent are multiple-intanstiated
over the anatomy of the agent. The several subsystems of the agent (e.g. organs)
can play different roles in different patterns.
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Emotion as pattern-based metacontrol
At the end of a functionalization + patterning process we will have an agent that
has a potentially large collection of functional patterns. In a specific instant there
may be many of them that can be enacted over the actual anatomical substrate
of the agent. A question hence arises: what patterns to activate at a particular
moment?. The decision and the enaction of the functional patterns is the mission
of the emotional system.
Deciding how to behave
The decision concerning what control patterns shall be activated depends on an
appraisal of the agent-environment situation in terms of agent goals. The result of
the appraisal is used in the instantiation of a pattern or patterns that best suit the
ongoing situation. In the words of Scherer (Scherer et al., 2001) this is a process of:
”interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the
five6 organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an exter-
nal or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the or-
ganism.”
Scherer sees emotions as episodes of subsystem synchronization driven by non-
linear appraisal processes (Scherer, 2000). This is a view of emotion strongly linked
to the component process model of emotion (Scherer et al., 2010). As was said
before, this view is grounded on the dynamically enacted functional processes of
the agent, hence being an ideal model for identifying emotion in cognitive archi-
tectures. For example, Ritter identifies some “emotional” patterns in a cognitive
architecture like SOAR (Ritter, 1993).
The systematic study of emotion using an architectural approach must clarify
what are the patterns that are enacted. This is a very difficult task for non triv-
ial agents and/or non trivial emotions. Organisms with sophisticated emotions
seem to be high in the complexity ladder. The use of a structure-centric, analyt-
ical approach is difficult due to the homogeneity of the integration infrastructure
of the agent and the overlay of functional patterns over the same anatomic compo-
nents. It is necessary to consider a behavioral analysis to complement the structural
one. The combination of the categorical and componential approaches to the anal-
ysis of emotions may provide an adequate roadmap to pattern identification. As
Panksepp says (Panksepp, 1998):
“The categorical approach can identify basic operating systems that ex-
ist in the brain, and the componential and constructivist approaches
6Information processing, Support, Executive, Action and Monitor.
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can provide schemata of how the genetically endowed systems develop
their full resolution by interacting with the vast complexity of the real
world.”
In summary, we understand emotion as a real-time adaptation mechanism based
on the activation of predefined patterns of organization of the agent. These patterns
have been produced (evolutionarily) for specific activities/niches. In a sense, emo-
tion selects the best available agent architecture for the present moment (esp. the
control, informational part).
Emotion and Structural Feedback
The emotional system is, in essence, a control system. However, instead of being a
controller in the domain of the physical magnitudes of the agent —e.g. temperature
or molecular concentration— it is a controller in the domain of functional organiza-
tion. Emotion implements a structural feedback mechanism (Sanz and Lo´pez, 2000).
In this control loop, the error signal is the evaluation of the degree of fitness be-
tween the functional state of the agent and the current state of affairs i.e. how well
the agent is doing. The action affects the enacted system architecture.
In general, the degree of wellness is a too much faceted aspect as to be useful as a
substrate for the patterning process. It is hence compacted before being broadcast
as a synthetic appraisal state. This broadcast state is the emotion that is actually
shaping the agent; an emotion that may be conscious and hence felt or may be not.
This model of emotion implies that emotions can be subconscious.
The signals that compose the globally broadcast state —several appraisal dimensions—
perform system-wide adaptation “to achieve a multi-level communication of sim-
plified but high impact information” (Fellous, 2004) throughout the agent.
Emotions are system-wide signals driving the pattern-based reconfiguration pro-
cess. In a sense, these emotions, as signals, constitute an emotional metacontrol bus
(Sanchez-Escribano and Sanz, 2012). When represented at the level of awareness
they constitute the emotional feelings. This vision of emotional experience is in
line with higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness (Rosenthal, 2009)
and with the model of emotion proposed by Sellers (2013) that defines emotions as
the mental experience of underlying motivations. Note that motivations are indeed
instantiated by references to feedback control loops.
The emotional system is a control system controlling the organization of the
other systems of the agent (Herrera-Perez and Sanz, 2013). In most cases these
systems are themselves controlled and hence the emotional system acts as a meta-
controller. The metacontrol bus is the set of signals that drive the reconfiguration,
by perceiving the functional state of the agent and by acting over the functional
elements of the agent. Figure 7 shows the deployment of an emotional system over
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Figure 7: The emotional system can be seen as a control system controlling the
lower control systems of the agent — a metacontroller. The metacontrol bus is
the set of signals that drive the reconfiguration.
a cognitive loop based on the ECL pattern (Sanz et al., 2010c). This is a control
system with two cognitive loops: the control level and the metacontrol level. The
control implements a target domain closure: it controls domain magnitudes. The
metasystem implements a morphofunctional closure: it perceives and controls sys-
tem function. Figure 8 shows the activities coupling perception and action at the
two levels. In essence, all the emotional system implements a metacognitive loop.
According to the conceptual act theory of emotion (Wilson-Mendenhall et al.,
2011) it is the mental representation of the ongoing situation what determines the
emotion experienced. In our theory we consider that the conceptualized situation
is the functional coupling of the agent with its environment. Emotions are hence
conceptually related to the functional structure of the agent. The set of concepts
behind them provide an ontology that constitutes the semantic substrate of the
morphofunctional elements of the agent (Herrera et al., 2012; Famaey et al., 2010).
The concrete realization of these concepts and their dynamics can have multiple
forms; see for example the dynamical systems realization by Treur (2013) or Larue
et al. (2013) in this volume or the analysis of emotion-generating networks in the
brain using a constructionist framework by Lindquist and Barrett (2012).
Emotion and Phenomenology
In essence, emotion captures the pursue of goals by leveraging morphofunctional-
ity. At the top level of the agent goal system, emotional phenomenality provides
the mechanism for assessing the relevance of the state of affairs. This is the reason
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Figure 8: Cognitive metacontrol seen as the layering of two cognitive control
loops: the world-level control implements a target domain closure, the meta-
level control implements a morphofunctional closure. The lower level i) collects
information about the target control domain (e.g. the robot environment), ii)
integrates this information into the run-time model used by the agent, iii)
projects into the future to anticipate states and determine value, iv) use the
anticipated value to select the right action and v) executes the action. In the
metacontrol loop what is observed is the functional state of the agent —sees
what it is able to do— and acts by reconfiguration —changing what it will be
able to do.
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why emotions are so powerful: they force the agent to pursue the most important
goals (Sanz et al., 2012).
When building emotion-experiencing machines, engineering the right phenomeno-
logical mechanism is crucial because it will be the origin of the intrinsic motivations
of the agents. We shall adopt an heterophenomenological engineering approach to
build phenomenologies into machines to match our own needs and not machine-
specific ones (Bartneck, 2002).
Science and technology
Model evaluation is always a complex aspect of cognitive systems modeling. The
evaluation shall be done in terms of what is the purpose of the modeling effort. In
general, most emotion modeling theories are focused on the provision of models
of the biological emotion. However, the model of emotions that we have presented
here shall be evaluated in terms of both science and technology:
• Science — Its explanatory power of the phenomenon of natural emotion.
• Technology — Its potentiality as an architectural asset for building better ma-
chines.
For the first class of evaluation the theoretical model must address two dual
aspects of emotion: 1) specific traits of animal or human emotion: appraisal, cogni-
tive integration, emotion regulation, conscious and unconscious emotions, etc. and
also 2) the concrete emotions themselves: fear, rage, jealousy, etc. Lots of painstak-
ing work is needed to identify the metacontrol systems realizing these processes
(Panksepp, 1998).
For the second evaluation task —artificial emotion— the development of the
model must offer a path into technological consolidation in the form of both designs
and reusable assets. These designs and assets, if adequate, could then be used
in the construction of emotional systems for artifacts to improve their behavior.
This improvement will essentially have the form of an increase in mission-level
resilience and could then be measured by means of suitable benchmarks. Note
that the emotional technology we are talking about is not a technology for emotion
expression or for understanding of human emotional expression (Picard, 1997) but
a technology for more robust machines.
Patterns in Biological Emotion
The patterned metacontrol theory of emotion can be used to frame and explain
biological emotion. In this section we will use an specific emotion —fear– to inves-
ASLab.org / A Model of Emotion as Patterned Metacontrol / A-2013-003 v 0.0 Draft 28
tigate the role that the theory may play in the identification of control patterns in
fear.
Fear is an adaptive response to stimuli that points to danger or threat, producing
escape responses from these stimuli and thus from their potential hazard. Fear may
also play a role at the multi-agent (social) level. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
1971) suggests that besides being an adaptive response of single agents it also facil-
itates the emergence of social ties in collective defense.
There are four characteristics of fear to take into account:
• The triggering stimuli (any danger stimulus, undesirable variation of any
stimulus, unexpected stimuli, etc.),
• the (maybe cognitive) evaluation and assessment of the situation and the
state,
• the modulator factors influenced by the learning and socio-cultural context,
and
• the functions: defense activation, emotion expression, decision-making, etc..
Usually, the triggering stimuli will come from outside the agent, but not always
(just consider the fear triggered by an ongoing myocardial infarction). In any case
this corresponds to the gathering of information at the lower levels. Note that this
information is devoid of any fear content. The triggering of fear happens at the next
level, by the appraisal processes that consciously or subconsciously decide that
there is a danger in terms of the valuation described in section . The appraisal pro-
cesses are modulated by the contents of the agent metalevel memory, a database
of past experiences of events, agent responses and results. Eventually, this process
culminates in the functional reorganization of the agent to provide the best struc-
ture to generate the most adequate behaviors —e.g. freeze, fight or run.
Depending on the concrete action, the basic functional patterns of autonomic
and somatic fear are three: a) blocking and defensive immobility, b) defensive ac-
tion and c) defensive escape. The implementation of fear mechanisms in the brain
has been studied by many authors. The most important body of work comes from
LeDoux (LeDoux, 1996) but most of his work is focused on the use of classical fear
conditioning as a behavioral tool for studying emotional memories and brain acti-
vation (identifying the role of the different memory systems is central to LeDoux
work). LeDoux work is centered on metalevel learning processes. Closer to the
morphofunctional topic of this article, Bradley (Bradley, 2000) studied the func-
tional and structural differences between the escape response and the freezing re-
sponse and how their somatic physiology is completely different. Psychophysio-
logical responses and somatic fear have also been studied by Hamm et al. (Hamm
et al., 1997), Caioppo et al. (Cacioppo et al., 2000) or Sabatinelli et al (Sabatinelli
et al., 2001).
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The patterned metacontrol model of emotion addresses the dynamic reorgani-
zation of biological agents to maximize their ecological resilience. LeDoux uses
the term ”survival circuit” to refer to this very same vision: ”survival circuits are
sensory-motor integrative devices that serve specific adaptive purposes” (LeDoux, 2012).
Mapping the Theory into Machines
The approach to transfer this model to machines is quite different from what can be
found in current research on artificial emotion (Bartneck et al., 2008). It is focused
on the core architectural issues more than in emotion externalization. Mapping
the patterned metacontrol model of emotions into machine realizations imply the
construction of changeable cognitive architectures. The pattern-based approach is
specially suitable for modular block-based systems. This is the best architectural
primitive to support the dynamic reorganization from a pattern set of reduced
cardinality. Issues of granularity may appear as finer-grained systems can offer
improved flexibility but may require computationally demanding reconfiguration
algorithms. The pattern-based approach, however, may help bounding this com-
plexity (Tchao et al., 2011).
The most adequate construction and deployment strategy for this class of sys-
tems is the use of a plastic integration infrastructure that provides the required
homogeneity and interface minimization. Modern software middleware platforms
can help with this (esp. distributed, real-time system platforms (Sanz et al., 2001),(OMG,
2007))
The technological path to leverage this model as an universal technology of ar-
tificial emotion includes two major activities that shall be addressed:
• The identification of the organizational patterns: the definition of the en-
actable collection of patterns that a particular agent may use. This includes
both persistent patterns and dynamic patterns (i.e. with different life-cycles).
Some of these patterns may be reverse-engineered from biological/brain sys-
tems but in most cases they will be the result of classical engineering design
efforts. An example of these patterns are the alternative organizations used in
some fault-tolerant systems, that are enacted as needed driven by the internal
detection of faults.
• The plastic engineering infrastructure: the technological substrate to sustain
the functional reconfiguration has requirements that go beyond state-of-the-
art real-time middleware technologies. These infrastructures shall be compo-
nential, self-referential, run-time changeable, real-time, multigranular, portable
and transparent. Some of these capabilities are already available (e.g. in
Real-Time CORBA) but others are still under development (Herna´ndez et al.,
2009).
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We are doing an implementation of this technology in our laboratory and using
it in robot control. We have completed Phase 0, developing an ad-hoc implemen-
tation of rule-based metacontrol over rigid control patterns (Bajuelos, 2011). The
modular controllers used in our robot are based on the instrumented and widely
available ROS robot software (Quigley et al., 2009).
The ongoing Phase 1 works are focused on the generalization of the reconfig-
uration methods, incorporating explicit representations of architectural and mis-
sion elements. The main aspects are related to the use of a rigorous ontology for
cognitive-emotional systems (Bermejo-Alonso et al., 2010), the use of explicit rep-
resentations of functions and goals (de la Mata and Rodrı´guez, 2010) and the use of
model-based reasoning at the software system level (Herna´ndez and Sanz, 2012).
Immediate future work is related to the realization of a bus-based emotion recon-
figuration architecture (Sanchez-Escribano and Sanz, 2012), the incorporation of
pattern learning mechanisms and the realization of some consciousness patterns
(Sanz et al., 2007b).
The main problems that are still open in the ASys implementation of the meta-
control system are related to:
• The dual representation of function in both implementational and goal terms.
• The processes of emotion dynamics — how to implement pattern change
without losing dependability.
• Concurrent emotions and emotion composition — pattern coexistence, inte-
gration and interference.
• Heterogeneous agent emotions — artificial theories-of-mind (ToM), emotional
societies.
• Perception of the emotional state — persistent questions of self and qualia.
Conclusions
In this article we have presented the patterned metacontrol model of emotions,
where emotions are seen as processes of goal-centric metacontrol of patterned con-
trol architectures of autonomous agents.
In the biological world these patterns are created using evolutionary mecha-
nisms. In the case of artificial systems the patterns are ad-hoc designs but can also
be selected evolutionarily alongside product lines.
This model of emotion shows that the capability for pattern-based adaptation
appears at two time scales: 1) at evolutionary time, by the creation of new patterns
and 2) at individual time, by the activation of those that are more relevant for the
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present state of affairs. Additionally, in metacognitive agents patterns can also be
learnt by individual agents at a cognitive level and afterwards automated.
This model of emotion can provide a theoretical framework for the explanation
of biological emotion. Emotions as global synthetic signals produced by appraisal
systems vehiculate reconfiguration processes of the functional organization of the
agent (morphofunctional processes). These appraisal-reorganization processes oc-
cur at many levels of the agent control architecture; they occur both at the conscious
and unconscious levels. At the conscious level the agent can perceive and experi-
ment its very own emotional processes, hence having emotional qualia.
This morphofunctional model of emotion can also be implemented and lever-
aged in technical systems. We have described our initial steps in the process of de-
veloping cross-domain software technology for its application in complex control
systems. The full potential of these approaches can only be manifest when architec-
tural organization alternatives are available. However, current robotic architectures
and infrastructures are in general too simple to fully leverage this vision.
Several theoretical issues are still open, for example: How are patterns com-
posed? How do concurrent emotions merge? Can this model explain all biological
emotions or is it just a model suitable for a limited class of them (e.g. the fight-or-
flight response)?
It is of special relevance the question of to what extent is this model applica-
ble. Emotion phenomena are enormously varied and this model only addresses
core architectural issues. However, this core approach can sustain derived expla-
nations of other aspects. For example, the expression of emotion —e.g. in faces
or in language— can be seen as an externalization of the core functional state for
social communication in search of agent benefit. Even when plenty of work awaits,
we consider that this theoretical model of patterned metacontrol is a good starting
point for a universal, cybernetic theory of emotion.
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